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Abstract
This paper analyzes share return behavior following large one-day share market declines, 
otherwise known as market crashes. In this event study, returns of individual shares listed on the 
First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange are analyzed. The first aim of this paper is to provide 
new evidence using recent data from 2008 to analyze share return behavior. The second aim is 
to confirm that the results of Wang et al. (2009) are identical on the Japanese market, despite the 
trading rules being significantly different to the American market.
A multivariate regression is utilized with the three day post-crash cumulative returns as the 
dependent variable. Six events are selected with crash day returns ranging between -7% and 
-10%. The magnitude of the post-crash three day cumulative return varies significantly in the 
range of 20.48% to -16.06% and there is great variation in the pattern of the post-crash returns.
While the event days are limited, the overall results are consistent with previous research, and 
prove that there is a lead-lag relation with the returns of larger shares leading those of smaller 
shares. By analyzing dates with both subsequent positive reversals and continued negative 
declines, we can draw the conclusion that large firms respond faster to new information whether 
it be good news or bad news. Several robustness tests produced similar results.
Considering that the Japanese market and American market vary considerably with regards 
to trading rules, the fact that a lead-lag relation exists on both markets suggests that it is due to 
fundamental behavior of traders as opposed to institutional features.
JEL Codes: G10, G12, G14
Keywords: Share market crash, share returns, lead-lag, size, event study 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Numerous studies have analyzed share market rebounds and the behavior of shares in the period 
following a large one-day share market decline. Many papers focus on longer-term rebounds occurring 
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over three to five years, however another group of researchers have analyzed reversals in the short 
term using weekly and monthly data. This paper focuses on short-run price rebounds that occur over 
the subsequent days immediately following a share market crash. Other papers in the same category 
include Cox and Peterson (1994), Bremer and Sweeney (1991) and Bremer et al. (1997).
The general finding on post-crash returns is that share prices reverse. Bremer and Sweeney (1991) 
and Atkins and Dyl (1990) found that price declines of at least 10% are followed by reversals. 
Specifically, Bremer and Sweeney (1991) document significant positive three-day abnormal returns 
following days with a price decline of 10% or more. Research by Bremer et al. (1997) specifically 
on the Japanese share market proved that returns for shares listed on the Nikkei 300 tend to be 
significantly positive after large price declines.
Another finding which has been well documented is a size based lead-lag effect. Research by Lo 
and MacKinlay (1990) proved that returns of large-capitalization shares almost always lead those 
of smaller shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange. In their paper, Lo and MacKinlay (1990) 
document a positive correlation in weekly returns of small firms and the lagged weekly returns of large 
firms. Their analysis found virtually no correlation between the returns of large shares and lagged 
small shares returns. They argue that this size based lead-lag relation is important because it indicates 
the transmission of information from large firms to small firms. Similarly, Mills and Jordanov (2000) 
documented a very similar pattern on the London stock exchange. Their research proved that a lead-
lag relation exists between portfolios of small firms and large firms constructed from the London 
stock exchange. Badrinath et al. (1995) analyze the process of information transmission between 
firms and show that for size-based portfolios a one month lead-lag relation exists, and for institutional 
ownership-based portfolios, portfolios of high institutional ownership lead the returns on portfolios 
with lower institutional ownership by up to two months.
While studies based on different share markets have proved that a lead-lag relation exists, the 
exact cause of it is still unclear. If market imperfections do not exist, then it would be expected that 
information transmission is instantaneous. Therefore researchers have attributed the lead-lag effect to 
the “thin trading” problem, noise traders, market liquidity, herd behavior, or as Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1995) suggest, to delayed reactions to common factors. Alternatively, Badrinath et al. (1995) suggest 
that firm size may proxy for the magnitude of information produced.
The aim of this paper is to examine the behavior of shares listed on the First Section of the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange in the period immediately following a large one-day share market decline. The event 
days are limited making it a small event study, nevertheless the results prove that a lead-lag relation 
exists on the Japanese share market. The First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange lists the largest 
and most traded shares in the Japanese market. It is an appropriate choice for this study for two main 
reasons. Firstly, Japan is an important and large market which requires attention, and secondly because 
it provides a market with a significantly different structure and trading rules on which to investigate if 
the lead-lag relation is due to institutional features or fundamental behavior of traders.
This study follows the methodology of Wang et al. (2009), and utilizes a multivariate regression 
with the three day post-crash returns as the dependent variable. Wang et al. (2009) studied the returns 
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of individual shares on the American market on crash days and during the post-crash period, and 
found that shares of large firms lead small firms on crash days, and also that large shares lead small 
shares in the immediate three-day post crash period. In other words, the results show that large firms 
respond faster to new information. For the purpose of this study, a three day timeframe was selected 
to be the post crash period, as other researchers such as Bremer and Sweeney (1991), in addition to 
Wang et al. (2009) have based their analysis on these days.
The results are consistent with previous literature, and reveal that a size based lead-lag relation 
exists. The sign for the size variable supports the finding that large firms respond faster to new 
information, whether it is good news or bad news. This paper contributes to financial literature in 
two ways. The first aim is to provide new evidence using recent data regarding share return behavior 
following large one-day share market declines on the Japanese market. Bremer et al. (1997) analyzed 
events during the 1980`s, while we have used events which occurred over twenty years later during 
2008, meaning this study provides new evidence on share behavior. The second aim is to confirm that 
the results of Wang et al. (2009) are identical on the Japanese market, despite the trading rules being 
significantly different to the American market.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the data utilized in this study and 
section 3 explains the methodology used. The empirical results and the robustness tests are discussed 
in section 4, and the results are summarized in section 5.
2. DATA
This study specifically focuses on the individual shares listed on the First Section of the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange. The First Section comprises the largest shares on the Japanese share market, 
providing an ideal sample to test the existence of the lead-lag effect post large one-day share market 
declines.
We have followed the methodology of Wang et al. (2009) and classified a crash date as a daily 
decrease in the TOPIX index of more than 5%. The six specific dates selected to be analyzed are the 
8th of October, 10th of October, 16th of October, 22nd of October, 24th of October and the 27th of October 
2008. As detailed in Table 1, the daily decrease in the index on all of these dates is reasonably large, 
ranging between -7% and -10%. As previously stated, in order to analyze share behavior in the post-
crash period, the cumulative return over the three days immediately following the crash is utilized as 
other researchers such as Wang et al. (2009) and Bremer (1991) have done. The cumulative three day 
return is calculated as:
RETi = (Pit+3 – Pit) / Pit  (1)
where RETi denotes the three day cumulative return of share i, Pit+3 denotes the share price at time t+3, 
and Pit denotes the share price at time t, the crash day. Table 1 summarizes the selected dates and data 
employed in this event study.
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The magnitude of the three day post-crash cumulative return varies significantly depending on the 
date. As Figure 1 shows, the index had three consecutive days of positive returns for the 16th and 27th, 
three consecutive negative returns for the 22nd, and a combination of both positive and negative returns 
for the 8th, 10th and 24th. This variation in the pattern of returns is one reason why these six dates were 
selected, and it is promising that the analysis may produce interesting results.
Figure 1
Graphs of the three day cumulative returns and daily returns
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Data on the TOPIX index, closing prices for individual shares, plus all financial data 
and ratios is obtained from the Nikkei Economic Electronic Databank System (NEEDS). 
The financial statements data is obtained from the firm`s annual financial statements in 
the NEEDS database for the previous financial year. 
Following Fama and French (1992) and Wang et al. (2009), utilities and financial 
firms are excluded from the analysis. Utilities are excluded because their financial 
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Table 1
Crash days, crash day returns and post-crash returns
Date Daily decrease in TOPIX % Cumulative post-crash  three day return % Sample size
8th October 2008 -8.04 6.37 1170
10th October 2008 -7.1 2.81 1171
16th October 2008 -9.52 10.66 1174
22nd October 2008 -7.05 -16.06 1174
24th October 2008 -7.5 3.0 1173
27th October 2008 -7.4 20.48 1174
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Data on the TOPIX index, closing prices for individual shares, plus all financial data　and ratios is 
obtained from the Nikkei Economic Electronic Databank System (NEEDS). The financial statements 
data is obtained from the firm`s annual financial statements in the NEEDS database for the previous 
financial year.
Following Fama and French (1992) and Wang et al. (2009), utilities and financial firms are excluded 
from the analysis. Utilities are excluded because their financial decisions are affected by regulation 
and financial firms are excluded because their financial ratios are not comparable to those of industrial 
firms. To be included in the data set, a firm must be listed on the First section, have a share price 
for both the crash date and the previous day, and have all other required data. Excluding shares 
which fail to meet the data requirements and utilities and financial firms reduced the sample size by 
approximately 500 shares, however the sample is still reasonably large at approximately 1174.
3. METHODOLOGY
3.1 Hypothesis
We hypothesize that the lead-lag relation documented by Lo and MacKinlay (1990) exists in the 
days immediately following a large one-day market decline. That is, that large share returns lead small 
share returns on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. In this study, the post-crash three 
day cumulative return is the dependent variable in a multivariate regression, with twelve independent 
variables, all of which have explanatory effects on share returns.
If the share market experiences a reversal after the large decline, then for the lead-lag relation to 
hold, we predict that the size variable will be positive and significant in the regressions. A positive 
sign will indicate that larger firms have higher post-crash returns, and imply that large firms respond 
faster to new information. In other words, a positive sign will imply that a size-based lead-lag relation 
exists in the days immediately following a large market decline. In previous research by Wang et al. 
(2009) the size variable is positive as reversals occurred.
If however the share market continues declining in the following days, then we predict that the size 
variable will be negative and significant as a negative sign will indicate that large firms decrease more 
in value than small firms. Wang et al. (2009) likewise found that size is negative on crash days.
Therefore if our research proves that size is positive when the market is trending upward in the days 
following a large decline, and negative when the market is continuing to trend downward, it will imply 
that large firms respond faster to new information and a size-based lead-lag relation exists. To be 
specific, we predict that for the 10th and 22nd size will be negative as the cumulative return is trending 
down, and for the other four days it will be positive as it is generally trending upward, as depicted in 
the graphs in Figure 1.
3.2 The Model
For the purpose of our study, we have followed the methodology of Wang et al. (2009), with the 
only difference being the exclusion of the industry dummy variable. Wang et al. (2009) employed a 
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multivariate regression analysis to determine how firm characteristics affect returns on both crash days 
and in the three day post-crash period.
As stated in section 3.1, this study employs a multivariate regression with the post-crash three 
day cumulative return as the dependent variable and twelve independent variables, all of which are 
believed to have explanatory effects on share returns. For simplicity, the independent variables are 
calculated as of the 1st of October, 2008. The linear regression model: 
RETit = β0 + β1 BETA + β2 SIZE + β3 MVBV +β4 ILLIQ + β5 TDTA + β6 LAR 
+β7 CFPS + β8 BEP + β9 SDLR + β10 LR1 +β11 LR2 + β12 LR3 + et  (2)
In this model the dependent variable RETit, is the cumulative share return for the three trading days 
immediately after the crash day. The cumulative three day post-crash share return RETit is calculated 
using equation (1). β0　is the a constant and β1, β2 … β12 are the regression coefficients. There are 
twelve independent variables included in the model. BETA is the CAPM beta of the share computed 
with monthly return data for the five year period from January 2002 to December 2006. SIZE is the 
logarithm of the firm’s market capitalization, calculated as the average of the daily figures for the 
year directly prior to October 1st. MVBV is the market-to-book ratio, calculated as the average of the 
weekly M/B ratios for the year directly prior to October 1st. ILLIQ is the illiquidity ratio employed by 
Amihud (2002), calculated as:
ILLIQ =    *1000
where Ri is the share i`s daily returns, VOLD id is the daily volume, and Di is the number of days in the 
period -252 to -30 days prior to October 1st for which it traded. We have following the methodology 
of Wang et al. (2009) and multiplied the Amihud ratio by 1000 to scale the figure. TDTA is the debt 
ratio (total debt / total assets) and LAR is the liquid assets ratio [(cash + marketable securities) / total 
assets], both calculated from the previous year’s financial statements. CFPS is the cash flow per share, 
and BEP is the basic earning power ratio (EBIT / total assets). SDLR is the standard deviation of the 
lagged share returns from -252 to -30 days prior to October 1st. In addition three lagged returns are 
included in the model: LR1 (lagged return 1) which is the cumulative return from -7 to -2 days prior to 
October 1st, LR2 (lagged return 2) which is the cumulative return from -70 to -2 days prior to October 
1st, and LR3 (lagged return 3) which is the cumulative return from -756 to -2 days prior to October 1st.
3.3 Control Variables
In Section 3.1 our predictions regarding the size variable are explained. In this section, we detail 
our predictions for the other eleven control variables included in the regression. Since this event 
study contains both days which are followed by positive reversals and days with continued negative 
declines, both situations are considered.
For beta, since beta measures the risk arising from general market movements, it is predicted that 
when the share market is declining beta will be negative and when the market is reversing upward that 
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beta will be positive. Market-to-book is not expected to be highly significant, reflecting the results of 
Wang et al. (2009). The illiquidity variable is predicted to be positive as Amihud (2002) documented a 
positive cross-sectional relationship between illiquidity and share returns, which signifies that illiquid 
shares reaction is smaller in magnitude compared to liquid shares. For the debt ratio we predict the 
sign to be negative during a market decline as firms with high debt are considered to have higher risk 
and be positive during a market reversal. The liquid assets variable is expected to be negative as Wang 
et al. (2009) found, however not highly significant. For cash flow, we predict it to be negative during 
a positive market reversal and positive during days when the market is trending down. The basic 
earning power ratio is expected to be positive as more profitable firms decrease less in value during 
crashes. Regarding the standard deviations of lagged returns variable, it is predicted that shares which 
are highly volatile prior to a market decline will continue to be more volatile after the decline. As 
such, we predict this variable to be negative if the market is continuing to decrease and positive if the 
market is reversing. For the three lagged return variables we cannot make justified predications as it 
will vary depending on the day.
3.4 Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis are detailed in Table 2. The mean 
return figures in the table are lower than the figures for the TOPIX index, suggesting that larger firms 
have higher returns than small firms in the immediate post-crash period. Positive skewness is present 
in the majority of the variables, which is reasonable during volatile times.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics of the variables 
Variables Mean Std. Dev Skewness Kurtosis Maximum Minimum
8th October 
RET 0.6766 12.0928 23.9320 578.7373 304.1948 -0.9965 
BETA 0.9958 0.6092 4.7950 58.8562 9.7847 -0.3876 
SIZE 24.8257 1.5648 0.6449 2.9973 30.5853 21.7333 
MVBV 1.2902 0.8738 2.7252 15.1957 8.3837 0.2597 
ILLIQ 0.0006 0.0019 9.5121 117.5535 0.0287 0.0000 
TDTA 0.5026 0.1962 -0.1171 2.1749 0.9311 0.0416 
LAR 0.1294 0.0979 1.7294 7.5788 0.7321 0.0006 
CFPS 1326.3980 13914.5400 15.7776 280.4415 280912.500 -2083.6500 
BEP 6.1789 5.2751 1.0311 9.9188 46.3900 -25.3400 
SDLR 0.0271 0.0079 1.0638 6.3403 0.0819 0.0056 
LR1 -0.0397 0.0717 4.7154 73.8085 1.1235 -0.4321 
LR2 -0.1655 0.1704 0.2582 3.3447 0.6111 -0.7573 
LR3 -0.2499 0.3676 2.3408 17.0627 3.1548 -0.9844 
10th October 
RET 0.0569 0.0761 0.5620 4.8682 0.4759 -0.2894 
BETA 0.9956 0.6093 4.7886 58.7802 9.7847 -0.3876 
SIZE 24.8283 1.5666 0.6433 2.9884 30.5853 21.7333 
MVBV 1.2912 0.8737 2.7214 15.1801 8.3837 0.2597 
ILLIQ 0.0006 0.0020 9.2213 107.6823 0.0287 0.0000 
TDTA 0.5027 0.1962 -0.1181 2.1767 0.9311 0.0416 
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Variables Mean Std. Dev Skewness Kurtosis Maximum Minimum
LAR 0.1293 0.0979 1.7308 7.5834 0.7321 0.0006 
CFPS 1325.5490 13908.6200 15.7845 280.6825 280912.500 -2083.6500 
BEP 6.1817 5.2745 1.0294 9.9128 46.3900 -25.3400 
SDLR 0.0271 0.0079 1.0636 6.3430 0.0819 0.0056 
LR1 -0.0397 0.0717 4.7177 73.8713 1.1235 -0.4321 
LR2 -0.1654 0.1704 0.2559 3.3439 0.6111 -0.7573 
LR3 -0.2499 0.3675 2.3419 17.0726 3.1548 -0.9844 
16th October 
RET 0.0957 0.0642 -0.3869 5.3376 0.3188 -0.3315 
BETA 0.9952 0.6086 4.7946 58.9088 9.7847 -0.3876 
SIZE 24.8271 1.5649 0.6457 2.9956 30.5853 21.7333 
MVBV 1.2901 0.8729 2.7247 15.2076 8.3837 0.2597 
ILLIQ 0.0006 0.0020 9.0768 105.2207 0.0287 0.0000 
TDTA 0.5027 0.1959 -0.1187 2.1806 0.9311 0.0416 
LAR 0.1293 0.0978 1.7310 7.5896 0.7321 0.0006 
CFPS 1322.4620 13890.9600 15.8049 281.4047 280912.500 -2083.6500 
BEP 6.1770 5.2704 1.0308 9.9230 46.3900 -25.3400 
SDLR 0.0271 0.0079 1.0661 6.3524 0.0819 0.0056 
LR1 -0.0397 0.0716 4.7175 73.9409 1.1235 -0.4321 
LR2 -0.1649 0.1705 0.2517 3.3327 0.6111 -0.7573 
LR3 -0.2496 0.3672 2.3397 17.0751 3.1548 -0.9844 
22nd October 
RET -0.1298 0.0740 -0.0735 3.0830 0.1542 -0.3682 
BETA 0.9953 0.6086 4.7949 58.9193 9.7847 -0.3876 
SIZE 24.8277 1.5646 0.6451 2.9964 30.5853 21.7333 
MVBV 1.2902 0.8728 2.7254 15.2127 8.3837 0.2597 
ILLIQ 0.0006 0.0020 9.0929 105.5163 0.0287 0.0000 
TDTA 0.5025 0.1960 -0.1158 2.1784 0.9311 0.0416 
LAR 0.1292 0.0978 1.7348 7.6034 0.7321 0.0006 
CFPS 1322.5060 13890.9500 15.8049 281.4048 280912.500 -2083.6500 
BEP 6.1824 5.2678 1.0304 9.9374 46.3900 -25.3400 
SDLR 0.0271 0.0079 1.0643 6.3451 0.0819 0.0056 
LR1 -0.0397 0.0716 4.7187 73.9591 1.1235 -0.4321 
LR2 -0.1652 0.1704 0.2546 3.3410 0.6111 -0.7573 
LR3 -0.2497 0.3673 2.3399 17.0732 3.1548 -0.9844 
24th October 
RET 0.0454 0.0747 0.0381 4.8746 0.3687 -0.4051 
BETA 0.9959 0.6085 4.7994 58.9824 9.7847 -0.3876 
SIZE 24.8242 1.5631 0.6480 3.0050 30.5853 21.7333 
MVBV 1.2891 0.8731 2.7273 15.2175 8.3837 0.2597 
ILLIQ 0.0006 0.0020 9.1257 106.0865 0.0287 0.0000 
TDTA 0.5027 0.1961 -0.1190 2.1777 0.9311 0.0416 
LAR 0.1293 0.0978 1.7297 7.5828 0.7321 0.0006 
CFPS 1323.2940 13896.8500 15.7981 281.1635 280912.500 -2083.6500 
BEP 6.1737 5.2711 1.0327 9.9286 46.3900 -25.3400 
SDLR 0.0271 0.0079 1.0622 6.3478 0.0819 0.0056 
LR1 -0.0397 0.0717 4.7175 73.9135 1.1235 -0.4321 
LR2 -0.1654 0.1703 0.2564 3.3453 0.6111 -0.7573 
LR3 -0.2500 0.3672 2.3438 17.0996 3.1548 -0.9844 
27th October
RET 0.1867 0.1141 0.2149 3.1124 0.6278 -0.2216 
BETA 0.9957 0.6083 4.8014 59.0214 9.7847 -0.3876 
SIZE 24.8243 1.5625 0.6481 3.0074 30.5853 21.7333 
MVBV 1.2888 0.8728 2.7289 15.2301 8.3837 0.2597 
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Variables Mean Std. Dev Skewness Kurtosis Maximum Minimum
ILLIQ 0.0006 0.0020 9.0587 104.9076 0.0287 0.0000 
TDTA 0.5027 0.1960 -0.1179 2.1786 0.9311 0.0416 
LAR 0.1293 0.0978 1.7310 7.5899 0.7321 0.0006 
CFPS 1322.3980 13890.9600 15.8049 281.4045 280912.500 -2083.6500 
BEP 6.1737 5.2689 1.0331 9.9370 46.3900 -25.3400 
SDLR 0.0271 0.0079 1.0634 6.3498 0.0819 0.0056 
LR1 -0.0397 0.0716 4.7167 73.9354 1.1235 -0.4321 
LR2 -0.1651 0.1704 0.2548 3.3384 0.6111 -0.7573 
LR3 -0.2496 0.3672 2.3397 17.0741 3.1548 -0.9844 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.1 Regression results
The regression results on the post-crash share returns for the six chosen dates are shown in Table 3. 
To ensure that multicollinearity between the variables is not an issue, variance inflation (VIF) tests are 
carried out. As shown in Table 3, the figures for the variance inflation tests are in the range of 1.0 and 
2.0, which is significantly low indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem in the regressions.
As detailed in Table 3, the size variable is positive in the post-crash period for the 8th, 16th, 24th and 
the 27th, and highly significant for the 8th, 24th and 27th. Size is negative and highly significant at the 
1% level for the 10th and 22nd, as the cumulative return is trending downward over both of these three 
day periods. The results are in line with the predictions detailed in section 3.1, and imply that larger 
firms increase more than small firms when the market is trending upward in the days following a 
large decline, and decrease more in value when the market continues to trend downward. This result 
suggests that large firms respond faster to new information and a size-based lead-lag relation exists. 
Our results support previous research by Wang et al. (2009), which documented the existence of a 
lead-lag relation in the post-crash period on the American share market for seven out of eight crashes, 
and is consistent with research by Lo and MacKinlay (1990), which proved that returns of large shares 
lead those of smaller shares. Wang et al. (2009) specifically documented that on crash days the size 
variable is negative and in the post-crash period is positive.
The results for the eleven control variables are similar to our predictions in section 3.3 however 
significance is lower than that for the size variable, suggesting that in the period following a large 
market decline size has the highest influence on share returns. The results for the control variables can 
be summarized as follows. Beta has mixed results however only the 8th has significance at the 10% 
level. Similarly, the sign for market-to-book variable is mixed and only highly significant for two of 
the eight days. The results for illiquidity are not as strong as expected, as the sign is positive for only 
two days and only one day has high significance. Overall the debt ratio is found to not be significant, 
which is similar to the findings in Wang et al. (2009), and the results for cash flow are mixed as the 
10th and 22nd are positive and significant, and the 24th and 27th are negative and significant. For the 
basic earning power ratio, the sign is negative for four days however overall high significance is 
not evident. The results for the standard deviations of lagged returns variable is as expected, with 
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Table 3 
This table shows the results when the three day post-crash cumulative returns are regressed on twelve explanatory 
variables. The variance inflation factor (VIF) test is used to test for multicollinearity. The figures in parentheses are the 
corresponding standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively.  
Explanatory 
variables
Oct. 8,  
2008 VIF
Oct. 10,  
2008 VIF
Oct. 16,  
2008 VIF
Oct. 22,  
2008 VIF
Oct. 24,  
2008 VIF
Oct. 27,  
2008 VIF
Intercept -14.5406** 0.4882*** 　 0.0926** 　 0.3470*** -0.1567*** -0.6917*** 　
　 (7.26) 　 (0.043) 　 (0.038) 　 (0.037) 　 (0.044) 　 (0.056) 　
BETA -1.0624* 1.2 0.0019 1.2 0.0013 1.2 -0.0047 1.2 0.0008 1.2 0.0068 1.2
　 (0.642) 　 (0.004) 　 (0.003) 　 (0.003) 　 (0.004) 　 (0.005) 　
SIZE 0.6961** 1.5 -0.0172*** 1.5 0.0012 1.5 -0.0174*** 1.5 0.0087*** 1.5 0.0328*** 1.5
　 (0.279) 　 (0.002) 　 (0.001) 　 (0.001) 　 (0.002) 　 (0.002) 　
MVBV 0.8011 2.0 0.0170*** 2.0 -0.0003 2.0 0.0054* 2.0 -0.0046 2.0 -0.0146*** 2.0
　 (0.575) 　 (0.003) 　 (0.003) 　 (0.003) 　 (0.003) 　 (0.004) 　
ILLIQ 1.2233 1.0 -0.2604 1.0 -1.6265* 1.0 1.6854* 1.0 -1.5623 1.0 -4.2649*** 1.0
　 (194.716) 　 (1.100) 　 (0.974) 　 (0.953) 　 (1.120) 　 (1.42) 　
TDTA -3.2636 1.9 0.0139 1.9 -0.0160 1.9 0.0274** 1.9 0.0012 1.9 -0.0013 1.9
　 (2.532) 　 (0.015) 　 (0.013) 　 (0.013) 　 (0.015) 　 (0.019) 　
LAR -6.7493 1.5 -0.0081 1.5 -0.0632*** 1.5 0.0930*** 1.5 -0.007 1.5 -0.1283*** 1.5
　 (4.465) 　 (0.027) 　 (0.024) 　 (0.023) 　 (0.027) 　 (0.034) 　
CFPS 0.0000 1.0 0.0000** 1.0 -1.31e-07 1.0 0.0000*** 1.0 -0.0000** 1.0 -0.0000*** 1.0
　 (0.000) 　 (0.000) 　 (0.000) 　 (0.000) 　 (0.000) 　 (0.000) 　
BEP -0.0727 1.8 -0.0008 1.8 -0.0000 1.8 -0.0014*** 1.8 0.0010* 1.8 0.0032*** 1.8
　 (0.091) 　 (0.001) 　 (0.000) 　 (0.000) 　 (0.000) 　 (0.001) 　
SDLR 20.4406 1.4 -1.1746*** 1.4 -0.5273* 1.4 -2.3448*** 1.4 -0.5435* 1.4 2.3802*** 1.4
　 (53.123) 　 (0.316) 　 (0.281) 　 (0.275) 　 (0.322) 　 (0.411) 　
LR1 2.1083 1.1 -0.0311 1.1 -0.0032 1.1 0.0228 1.1 0.0270 1.1 -0.0738* 1.1
　 (5.237) 　 (0.031) 　 (0.028) 　 (0.027) 　 (0.032) 　 (0.041) 　
LR2 1.5138 1.5 0.0269* 1.5 -0.0363*** 1.5 0.0589*** 1.5 -0.0165 1.5 -0.1079*** 1.5
　 (2.557) 　 (0.015) 　 (0.014) 　 (0.013) 　 (0.015) 　 (0.020) 　
LR3 -2.6144**  1.4 -0.0178*** 1.4 0.0089 1.4 -0.0314*** 1.4 0.0030 1.4 0.0312*** 1.4
　 (1.160) 　 (0.007) 　 (0.006) 　 (0.006) 　 (0.007) 　 (0.009) 　
Adjusted  
R-squared 0.0084 　 0.1163 　 0.0131 　 0.2903 　 0.0409 　 0.3322 　
Number of 
firms
1170 　 1171 　 1174 　 1174 　 1173 　 1174 　
a negative sign and high significance for the 10th, 16th, 22nd and 24th and for the 27th is positive and 
significant as the three day post crash period contains three positive daily returns. The returns for the 
lagged variables are mixed and vary in the level of significance depending on the day.
The regression results indicate that larger firms respond faster to new information, and that a 
size based lead-lag relation exists in the days immediately following a large market decline on the 
Japanese share market. Previous studies focus on dates which are followed by positive reversals, and 
as such, they conclude that the size variable is positive and positive abnormal returns exist. This study 
analyses dates with both positive reversals and continued negative declines, meaning that the sign of 
the size variable depends on the trend of the share market. Nevertheless, the results imply that a size-
based lead-lag relation exists with large firms responding faster to new information.
4.2 Robustness tests
In this section of our study, several robustness tests on the multivariate regression are presented. 
The first robustness test reruns the regression with a different proxy for illiquidity. In the original 
regression the illiquidity variable was calculated as the Amihud ratio, however for this part of the 
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analysis the natural logarithm of the average of yen trading volume over a specified period, DVOL, is 
employed as a proxy for liquidity (Brennan et al. 1998). The results are shown in Table 4.
 The size variable is positive and highly significant at the 1% level for the 8th, 24th and 27th, and 
negative and highly significant at the 1% level for the 10th and 22nd. These results indicate that our 
findings in the three day post-crash period are robust to the use of a different proxy for illiquidity, 
or in this case, substituting with a proxy for liquidity. The main conclusion to be drawn from this is 
that a lead-lag relation exists in the period following a large share market decline. The results for the 
control variables are mixed and no distinct pattern in the sign or significance levels is evident, as was 
documented in the original regression in Table 3.
As a second robustness test, the original sample is trimmed to reduce the possibility of outliers 
biasing the regression results. Each variable is trimmed at the 0.05% and 99.5% levels to ensure that 
the possibility of large outliers biasing the results is eliminated. Wang et al. (2009) used a similar 
test in their research on American share market crashes, leading us to replicate it as a robustness test. 
Table 4
This table shows the robustness test results when ILLIQ is replaced with a different proxy for illiquidity. That is, the 
results when ILLIQ (Amihud`s illiquidity ratio) is replaced with DVOL, a figure relating to trading volume. The figures 
in parentheses are the corresponding standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance 
respectively. 
Explanatory  
variables Oct. 8, 2008 Oct.10, 2008 Oct.16, 2008 Oct. 22, 2008 Oct. 24, 2008 Oct. 27, 2008
Intercept -25.7498*** 0.4385*** 0.1247*** 0.2936*** -0.1552*** -0.5899***
　 (8.313) (0.049) (0.044) (0.043) (0.050) (0.064)
BETA -0.7506 0.0032 -0.0000 -0.0029*** 0.0004 0.0031
　 (0.651) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
SIZE 1.4446*** -0.0139*** -0.0014 -0.0134*** 0.0082*** 0.0249***
　 (0.400) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
MVBV 0.6541 0.0163*** -0.0000 0.0050* -0.0048 -0.0138***
　 (0.574) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
DVOL -0.7976** -0.0034* 0.0032** -0.0048*** 0.0010 0.0097***
　 (0.311) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
TDTA -1.6377 0.0213 -0.020 0.0347** 0.0015 -0.0146
　 (2.586) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.020)
LAR -7.848* -0.0126 -0.0590** 0.0869*** -0.0059 -0.1154***
　 (4.473) (0.027) (0.024) (0.023) (0.027) (0.035)
CFPS 0.0000 2.17e-07 -4.79e-08 4.49e-07*** -3.28e-07* -6.54e-07***
　 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BEP -0.0886 -0.0008 0.0001 -0.0015*** 0.0010* 0.0034***
　 (0.091) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
SDLR 85.4761 -0.8971*** -0.7890** -1.9568*** -0.6247* 1.5982***
　 (58.746) (0.349) (0.310) (0.302) (0.356) (0.452)
LR1 2.1968 -0.0306 -0.0035 0.0233 0.0270 -0.0745*
　 (5.222) (0.031) (0.028) (0.027) (0.032) (0.040)
LR2 1.0912 0.0250 -0.0344** 0.0561*** -0.0159 -0.1023***
　 (2.555) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.020)
LR3 -2.589* -0.0176** 0.0091 -0.0315*** 0.0032 0.0317***
　 (1.156) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
Adjusted R-squared 0.0140 0.1189 0.0142 0.2940 0.0395 0.3367
Number of firms 1170 1171 1174 1174 1173 1174
Japanese share returns in the immediate post-crash periodMarch 2015 － 69 －
The regression results with all variables trimmed are presented in Table 5. The results are virtually 
identical, with the only difference being that the significance level for size on the 8th has decreased.
As an additional robustness test the regression results including the DVOL variable as a proxy for 
liquidity were trimmed, and produced virtually the same results as Table 4, however they have not 
been included in this paper.
The three robustness tests all lead to the conclusion that the original regression results are robust, 
and that a size based lead-lag relation exists in the period following a large share market decline on 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigates the returns of individual shares in the three day period following a large 
one-day market decline, otherwise known as a share market crash. The regression results show that 
large shares lead small shares, meaning that a lead-lag relation exists. The results are similar to those 
Table 5
This table shows the regression results when each explanatory variable is trimmed at the 99.5% and 0.5% levels to 
reduce the effect of outliers on the regression. The figures in parentheses are the corresponding standard errors. ***, **, 
and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively.
Explanatory  
variables Oct. 8, 2008 Oct. 10, 2008 Oct. 16, 2008 Oct. 22, 2008 Oct. 24, 2008 Oct. 27, 2008
Intercept -2.4600 0.4772*** 0.0932** 0.3595*** -0.1299*** -0.6645***
(8.292) (0.049) (0.043) (0.043) (0.050) (0.064)
BETA -1.8080** -0.0110** 0.0058 -0.0093** -0.0009 0.0120*
(0.922) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
SIZE 0.2653 -0.0170*** 0.0011 -0.0175*** 0.0078*** 0.0316***
(0.319) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
MVBV 1.4527* 0.0147*** -0.0039 0.0091** -0.0075 -0.0211***
(0.816) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
ILLIQ -1105.783*** -0.2345 -1.970 1.6689 -6.6372*** -12.2605***
(401.613) (2.394) (2.071) (2.033) (2.406) (3.015)
TDTA -4.1837 0.0312* -0.0170 0.0259* 0.0063 -0.0118
(2.758) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.021)
LAR -6.553 -0.0056 -0.0462* 0.0732*** -0.0036 -0.1153***
(5.069) (0.030) (0.027) (0.026) (0.031) (0.039)
CFPS 0.0013*** 1.47e-06** -1.47e-06** -1.08e-06* 1.69e-06** 2.12e-06**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BEP -0.1254 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0013** 0.0012 0.0027***
(0.121) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SDLR -10.2321 -1.0370*** -0.4791 -2.7056*** -0.6435* 2.9508***
(64.071) (0.378) (0.336) (0.330) (0.386) (0.490)
LR1 1.1406 0.0125 -0.0409 0.0737** 0.0092 -0.1472***
(7.275) (0.043) (0.038) (0.037) (0.044) (0.056)
LR2 0.4560 -0.0143 -0.0459*** 0.0533*** -0.0178 -0.1056***
(2.922) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.022)
LR3 -2.575* -0.0248*** 0.0186** -0.0418*** 0.0017 0.0425***
(1.501) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012)
Adjusted R-squared 0.1078 0.1164 0.0224 0.2927 0.0393 0.3377
Number of firms 1064 1064 1067 1067 1066 1067
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of Wang et al. (2009) using data on the American share market, and support previous research by Lo 
and MacKinlay (1990).
This event study is based on the data of approximately 1,174 shares listed in the First Section of 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange, meaning that the sample is composed of the largest and most frequently 
traded shares in the Japanese market. This study differs from other research as it analyses dates 
with both subsequent positive reversals and continued negative declines. Our analysis of six event 
days shows that when the share market is trending upward in the days following a large one-day 
decline the size variable is positive, and when the market is continuing to trend downward the size 
variable is negative. Larger firms have higher returns when the market is trending upward in the 
days immediately following a large decline, and decrease more in value when the market continues 
to trend downward. This result can be interpreted as the sign of the size variable in the regression 
being dependent on the trend of the share market. By analyzing dates with both subsequent positive 
reversals and continued negative declines, we can draw the conclusion that large firms respond faster 
to new information whether it be good news or bad news. Our research confirms that there is a definite 
relationship between firm size and share returns, and that a size-based lead-lag relation exists.
This paper contributes to financial literature by providing new evidence using recent data regarding 
share return behavior following large one-day share market declines on the Japanese market. 
Significant positive returns after large price declines are reported for the four events with an upward 
market trend, in line with the findings of Bremer et al. (1997). Furthermore, the analysis confirms 
that the results of Wang et al. (2009) are identical on the Japanese market. In other words, the data 
supports the existence of a lead-lag relation between large shares and small shares. As originally 
discovered by Lo and MacKinlay (1990), transmission of information from large firms to small firms 
occurs, with large firms responding faster to new information.
Our findings show that Japan has similar patterns regarding post-crash share returns to both 
America, as documented by Wang et al. (2009) and England, as replicated by Mills and Jordanov 
(2010). Considering that the Japanese market varies considerably to both of these markets with regards 
to trading rules, the fact that a lead-lag relation exists on all three markets suggests that it is due to 
fundamental behavior of traders as opposed to institutional features. Researchers are still unsure of the 
exact cause of the lead-lag relationship, however as Badrinath et al. (1995) suggests, it is possible that 
firm size may proxy for the magnitude of information produced.
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